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ABSTRACT   
In today’s ever-competitive banking environment, poor corporate governance has been identified 
as a powerful negative force against the performance and profitability of banks operating in 
Nigeria. This study examined the problems militating against effective corporate governance in 
the Nigerian banking industry. Thus, the aim of this study was to understand the problems and 
challenges responsible for persistent poor corporate governance in Nigerian banking sector.  In 
the course of the research study, six (6) commercial banks in Nigeria were chosen.  The 
stakeholders interviewed included senior executives and some middle level managers including a 
broad spectrum of bank customers. Data for the study were gathered over three-month period 
using unstructured set of interview questions and data analysis was carried out through thematic 
evidences arising from the data analyzed.  Corporate governance has to do with the management 
of banks profitably so that they can increase the wealth of shareholders and serve the purpose of 
other stakeholders.   Over the last two decades, corporate governance in the Nigerian banking 
sector had suffered poor management culminating in distress and bankruptcy of many banks.  
There was unbridled corruption and financial malpractices in the rank and file of the banks’ 
staff.   The Federal Government through the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) had to introduce 
various fiscal and monetary policies including recapitalization and consolidation policies to 
restore sanity in the banking sector.   In recognition of the fact that the banking sector is 
essential for the growth and survival of any nation, this study recommends that CEO duality 
should not be encouraged any longer in banks.  Furthermore, persons to be appointed to high 
positions of authority and responsibility should be of proven integrity with adequate professional 
qualification and experience to manage the banks to success.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Generally speaking, corporate governance can be seen as the way an organization is governed or 
managed.  In other words, it is the system by which a bank or any corporate organization is  
directed or controlled (Genmax, 2008).  Corporate governance in a financial institution refers to 
the way the bank is managed to enable it operate profitably to increase the wealth of its owners. 
An organization is usually managed by its top management.  The ultimate aim is to lead that 
organization towards achieving its set goals and objectives.  To a profit-making organization 
such as a bank, the objective is to maximize profitability and also to render superior customer 
service.  One of the main objectives of effective corporate governance is to eliminate conflict of 
interest between the company directors and senior managers on the one hand and the company 
owners (the shareholders) and management on the other hand (Dean, 2001).   Unless there are 
qualified and experienced people at the helm of affair doing the right thing at the right time, the 
goals and objectives of the organization will not be achieved.   Therefore, effective and action-
oriented corporate governance is the key to performance and profitability in a bank.  Effective 
corporate governance is that which aligns top management interests with the interest of the 
shareholders thereby producing competitive advantage for the firm.   
 
 
 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION    
 
Definition of Corporate Governance by the Encyclopedia  
 
In its definition, the encyclopedia emphasized the importance of corporate governance for both  
 
business and economic development.  It also highlights how to secure and motivate efficient  
 
management of organizations by the use of incentive mechanisms, organizational designs and  
 
legislation.  By so doing, corporate managers will be motivated to work harder in order to  
 
improve financial performance of the corporate body and deliver a competitive rate of returns  
 
and attractive dividend payment to shareholders. 
 
Oxelheim and Randoy (2001), gave the definition of corporate governance through investment- 
 
returns perspective.  They stated that corporate governance deals with the ways in which  
 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.   
 
The authors argued that corporate governance deals with the way in which suppliers of finance to  
 
a corporation can sleep with their two eyes closed and be rest assured that they will get a return  
 
on their investment.  But in corporate governance, how do we make sure that Managers do not  
 
steal the capital invested in the business or put the invested funds in a bad project that will yield  
 
no returns? How do suppliers of finance control Managers?  These questions have not been  
 
answered, and this is why the concept of corporate governance continues to generate debate and  
 
controversy in international circle. 
 
The issue of corporate governance is further compounded by the fact that there is no  
 
technological invention yet in existence that can help us determine the construction of the mind  
 
while looking at the face of the individual.  It is a big frustration in corporate governance because  
 
the executive you are engaging to run a firm may have all the shines and glitters of honesty on  
 
his face but in his mind lies a pool of bile and evil plot to ruin the business (Obi, 2016). 
 
The International Chamber of Commerce provides a corporate-specific definition of corporate  
 
governance:  It is of the view that corporate governance is the relationship between Corporate  
 
Managers, Directors and providers of equity capital and other stakeholders who supply materials  
 
and invest their capital to earn a return.   
 
Corporate governance ensures that top Management and the Board of Directors remain  
 
accountable in the pursuit of corporate objectives.  The corporation itself must operate in  
 
conformity with the laws and regulations of the government.  
 
Authors are yet to agree on a universally accepted definition of corporate governance.  Different  
 
definitions have been put forward by different authors even though they are all talking about  
 
organizational leadership and being at the helm of affairs in a bank and other corporate entities.    
 
However, the most widely used definition is the one given by Organization for Economic 
 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) which states that “Corporate governance is the system  
 
by which corporate organizations are directed and controlled.  The corporate governance  
 
structure specifies the rights and responsibilities of different participants in a corporate  
 
organization, such as, the Board of Directors, Managers, Shareholders and other Stakeholders,  
 
and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs.  By doing this,  
 
it also provides the structure through which the objectives of the firm are set and the means  
 
through which these objectives are to be attained (Nor, 2009).  An up-date document issued by  
 
the OECD in 2004, clearly stated that Corporate Governance stands for the following: 
 
“Corporate Governance involves a set of relationships between the management of a corporate  
 
entity, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders in the organization.  Corporate   
 
governance also provides the structure through which the set goals and objectives of the  
 
organization are to be achieved.  
 
It therefore follows that good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the  
 
Board and Management of the organization to pursue objectives that are in the interest of the  
 
company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring of activities.  When there  
 
is good corporate governance within an organization and across the national economy, it helps to  
 
provide a degree of confidence that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy.    
 
As a result, the cost of capital will be lower and the firm will be encouraged to use resources  
 
more efficiently thereby impacting positively on corporate profitability (Bhagat, 2007). 
 
From the definition given by the OECD, we can clearly see that corporate governance includes  
 
the relationship of a company to its shareholders and to society, the promotion of fairness,  
 
transparency and accountability.  It shows that managers are required to ensure that the actions  
 
they take are consistent with the interests of shareholders and other stakeholder. The key points 
 
of interest in corporate governance therefore include issues of transparency and accountability,  
 
meeting the legal and regulatory conditions of the government, taking appropriate risk   
 
management measures, maintaining smooth and accurate information flow across the  
 
organization.   When the above issues are correctly dealt with in an organization, it leads to  
 
increased profitability (Oman, 2003).  
       
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Corporate Governance and its Diverse Concepts (Theories) 
 
Various authors and scholars have different concepts of Corporate Governance but this article  
 
concentrated on four major concepts or four scholarly theories of corporate governance. 
 
These four concepts are: (a) Agency Concept of Corporate Governance, (b) Stewardship Concept                 
 
(c) Resource Dependency Concept, and (d) Stakeholder Concept.  
 
(1)  Agency Concept of Corporate Governance 
 
One of the conceptual principles underlying the issue of corporate governance is the Agency 
Concept developed by Oman (2003) resulting out of the separation of ownership and control.  
Investors have surplus funds to invest but due to technical constraints, such as, inadequate 
managerial expertise and time to manage the funds, employ the services of managers.   
The investors thus assume the responsibility of investing their funds in profitable ventures to 
generate good returns and to adequately reward the managers for their services.  
There is a problem with agency concept arising from the fact that the actions of managers are not 
always in consonance with the interest of the financiers.  Some of their actions are even 
completely detrimental to the fortunes of the financiers.  Thus Agency problem as described by 
Oman (2003) focuses on the consumption of perquisites by managers and other types of empire 
building.  It is interesting that these managers often tend to entrench themselves in power. 
According to Klapper and Love (2002), managers can expropriate shareholders’ funds by 
entrenching themselves and staying on the job even if they are no longer competent or qualified 
to run the firm.  Managerial expropriation of funds can also take more elaborate forms than just 
taking cash out, such as transfer pricing (Klapper and Love, 2002).  Such practices as transfer 
pricing, asset stripping, and investor dilution, though often legal, have largely the same effect as 
theft.  Additionally, managerial expropriation could also take the form of diversion of corporate 
opportunities from the firm, installing possibly unqualified family members in key managerial 
positions, or over-paying executives, using the profits of the firm to benefit themselves rather 
than returning the  money to the investors (La Porta, 2000).  As a result of the interest of the 
opportunistic, selfish managers, there is sometimes agency loss which is the extent to which 
returns to the residual claimants, the owners fall below what they would be if the owners, 
exercised direct control over the company (Oman, 2003). 
The remedies to this conception of the agency problem within corporate governance involves the 
acceptance of certain agency costs involved either in creating incentives or sanctions that will 
align executive personal interest with the interest of the shareholders (Roberts, 2004).  Thus, the 
principles of corporate governance are meant to control the internal and external entrenchment 
practices of executives through internal and external control mechanisms.   
(2) Stewardship Concept of Corporate Governance 
 
The stewardship concept of corporate governance emerged as a result of the seminal work by 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985).  The concept is based on the assumption that the interest of 
shareholders and the interest of management are aligned therefore management is motivated to 
take decisions that would maximize performance and the total value of the company.  The 
concept believes that there is greater utility in cooperative than individualistic behavior and 
therefore recommends a mutual-result approach where the action of management will be 
maximizing shareholders wealth, it will, at the same time, be meeting their personal, needs.     
The managers protect and maximize shareholders wealth through firm performance, because by 
so doing, their utility functions are maximized (Demsetz et al., 1985).  To achieve this goal 
congruence, the shareholders must put in place appropriate empowering governance structures 
and mechanisms, information and authority to facilitate the autonomy of management to take 
decisions that would maximize their utility as they achieve organizational rather than self-serving 
objectives.  For Chief Executive Officers who are stewards, their pro-organizational actions are 
best facilitated when the corporate governance structures give them high authority and discretion  
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).  The two authors identified five components of the management 
philosophy of stewardship as trust, open communication, empowerment, long-term orientation 
and performance enhancement.   
  
 
 
(3) Resource Dependency Theory of Corporate Governance 
 
Resource Dependency Theory of Corporate Governance was developed by Grosfeld and Metrick 
(2002) with the objective of emphasizing the important role played by board of directors in 
providing access to resources that would enhance the company’s performance and protect it 
against externalities.  Companies require resources in areas of finance, human resources, 
technical, information, communication and technology to function properly and to achieve their 
corporate objectives. 
Emenuga, (2006) posit that the accessibility to resources enhances organizational functioning, 
performance and survival.  Estrin, (2001) argued that resource dependency theory focuses on the 
crucial role that the directors play in providing or securing essential resources for the company 
through their linkages to the external environment.  They contended that directors bring 
resources to the company in the form of information, skills, access to key constituents such as 
suppliers, buyers, public policy makers, social groups as well as legitimacy.  Organizations 
depend on each other for business because they form the largest proportion of the organization’s 
customer base, meaning that the actions of one organization can greatly influence the financial 
performance of the other either positively or negatively.  Therefore, there is the need for 
organizations to establish relationships at board levels (Jensen, 2001).  Dependency theory 
provides focus on the appointment of representatives of independent organizations as a means of 
gaining accessibility to resources critical to the organization’s success (Jensen, 2001). 
  
 
 
According to Oman (2003) boards provide advice, counsel and know-how, legitimacy and 
reputation, channel of communicating information with external organizations, and preferential  
access to commitments or support from important factors outside the firm.  The board’s perform 
these functions through social and professional networking (Jensen, 2001). Abdullah and 
Valentine (2009) classified directors into four categories, namely; insiders, business experts, 
support specialists, and community leaders of thought.  Zahra and Pearce (2009) posit that the 
diverse background of the directors enhance the quality of their advice.  The theory favours 
larger boards (Dalton, 2009). 
(4) Stakeholder Theory of corporate Governance 
 
Stakeholder Theory of Corporate Governance was developed by Freeman (1984) with emphasis 
on the need for managers to have corporate accountability to stakeholders instead of 
shareholders.  Stakeholders are any group or individual that can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of a corporation’s purpose (Freeman, 1984).  John and Senbet, (1998) defined 
stakeholders as identifiable groups or persons who have legitimate interest in an organization and 
these interests have intrinsic value.   
Stakeholder theory is interested in how managerial decision making affect all the stakeholders 
and no one interest should be able to dominate the others. Stakeholder theory like the resource 
dependency theory, also proposed for the representation of the various interest groups on the 
organization’s board in order to ensure consensus building and to avoid conflicts.  The board 
therefore serves as arbitration over the conflicting interests of the stakeholders and brings about 
cohesion needed for the achievement of the organizational objectives (John and Senbet, 2012). 
In spite of the good intentions of the theory, it has been criticized for putting too much burden on 
managers by making them accountable to many stakeholders without specific guidelines for 
solving problems resulting from conflicting interests.  This situation has given managers the 
discretionary powers to decide on whose interest to serve (Jensen, 2001).  Managers should 
pursue objectives that would lead to increasing the long-term value of the firm since this would 
not be attained by ignoring the interest of some of the stakeholders.   
Jensen (2001) also criticized the theory for adopting a single-valued objective of maximizing the 
wealth of its stakeholders.  According to him, the performance of an organization is not only 
measured by returns to the stakeholders but equally important is the management of information 
in the organization with particular reference to vertical communication, inter-personal 
relationships in the organization and the working environment. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
To consummate this study, six (6) commercial banks in Nigeria were chosen. The stakeholders 
interviewed included members of top management, middle level managers and broad spectrum 
of bank customers. Data for the study were gathered over three-month period using unstructured 
set of interview questions and data analysis was carried out through thematic evidences arising 
from the data analyzed.  The areas covered in the interview questions included; top management 
responsibilities, their remuneration, fringe benefits and bonuses. The interview questions also 
covered the appointment of directors, their powers and responsibilities as well as the issue of 
financial malpractices and insider abuses in banks (The six banks used for the study were; Union 
Bank of Nigeria Plc., First Bank of Nigeria Plc., Guaranty Trust Bank Plc., Zenith Bank Plc., 
United Bank for Africa Plc. and Wema Bank Plc.).   
 
 
 
  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Corporate Governance and its Principles 
  
With the increasing globalization of business activities and liberalization of trade among the  
 
nations of the world, there arose the need to ensure uniformity in the practice of corporate  
 
governance the world over.  Following this need, the Hampel committee (1998) developed some  
 
basic principles of good corporate governance and sets out a code of best practices usually  
 
referred to as “Combined Code”.  Some of the major provisions in the code include the  
 
following: 
 
1.   Every listed company should be headed by an effective Board which should lead and 
control the company.  The Board should meet regularly and should have a formal 
schedule of matters left for it for decision-making.  Directors should bring an independent   
 judgment to bear on issues of strategy, performance, resources and standards of conduct.  
Directors should receive appropriate training on first appointment.   
2.  There are two key tasks at the top of every public company – running of the Board by the 
Chairman of the Board of Directors, and the functions of the Chief Executive Officer 
who has the executive responsibility for the operation of the company’s business. There 
should be clear division of responsibilities between the two top offices so as to ensure a 
balance of power and authority and thus prevent a situation where one person has 
unfettered powers of decision-making. 
3. The Board of Directors should have a balance between Executive and Non-Executive 
Directors with, at least, one-third of the members sitting as Non-Executive Directors.  
The Non-Executive Directors should be independent of the management of the business 
and free of any business relationships that could interfere with their independence. 
4. There should be a formal and transparent procedure for the appointment of Directors and 
all Directors should offer themselves for re-election every three years. 
5 Levels of remunerations should be sufficient to attract and retain the Directors to run the 
company successfully, but should not be excessive.  Part of the payment to Directors 
should be in the form of performance-related element. 
6. The Board of Directors should use the Annual General Meeting to communicate with the 
individual investors and encourage them to continue to identify with the company.  
Corporate Governance and Organizational Profitability 
 
Corporate Governance is an important concept that relates to the way and manner in which  
 
financial resources available to an organization are judiciously used to achieve the overall  
 
corporate objective of an organization, it keeps the organization in business and creates a greater  
 
prospect for future opportunities (Jensen, 2001).   Good corporate governance is the key factor    
 
for achieving increased organizational profitability because top management and their  
 
subordinates agree to work in accord, pulling in the same direction to make the firm a success.  
 
Furthermore, good corporate governance is important because it promotes good leadership  
 
within the corporate sector.  Corporate governance has the following attributes; leadership for  
 
accountability and transparency, leadership for efficiency, leadership for integrity and leadership  
 
that respects the rights of all stakeholders (Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda, 2000).      
 
Under sound corporate governance, the organization is governed with a framework which  
 
provides an enabling environment within which its human resources can contribute maximally  
 
and bring to bear their full creative powers towards finding solutions to shared problems (Gupta,  
 
1999).    
 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance and the Strengthening of Global Financial Markets 
Sound corporate governance practices have become critical to world-wide efforts to stabilize and 
strengthen global financial markets and protect investors and depositors.  They help companies 
and banks in particular to improve their performance and attract investment. 
Current preoccupation with corporate governance can be pinpointed at two events: 
The East Asian Crisis of 1997 saw the economies of Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia 
and Philippines severely affected by the exit of foreign capital after property assets collapsed.  
The lack of corporate governance mechanisms in the corporate cultures of these countries 
highlighted the weaknesses of the institutions in their economies.  
The second event was the American corporate crises 2001-2002 which was the collapse of two 
giant corporations:  Enron and World-Com, and the ensuing scandals and collapses in other 
corporations such as Arthur Anderson, Global Crossing and Tyco. 
Corporate Governance Principles and Codes 
Corporate governance principles and codes have been developed in different countries and issued 
from stock exchanges, corporations, institutional investors, or associations (institutes) of 
Directors and managers with the support of governments and international organizations.  As a 
rule, compliance with these governance recommendations is not mandated by law, although the 
codes linked in some instances to stock exchange listing requirements may have a coercive 
effect.  For example, banks and other companies quoted on the London and Toronto Stock 
Exchanges formally need not follow the recommendations of their respective nation al codes.   
However, they must disclose whether they follow the recommendations in those documents and, 
where not, they should provide explanations concerning divergent practices.  Such disclosure 
requirements exert a significant pressure on listed banks and other companies for compliance.  
Premium for Good Corporate Governance 
 Research shows that investors from all over the world indicate that they will pay large premiums 
for companies with effective Corporate Governance.  One of such study conducted by McKinsey 
quarterly found that institutional investors in emerging market companies will be willing to pay 
as much as 30% more for shares in companies with good corporate governance.  Furthermore, it 
showed that companies with better Corporate Governance practices had higher price-to-book 
ratios, demonstrating that investors do indeed value good performance (Boulton, 2000). 
Lower borrowing cost has also been associated with Corporate Governance.  The importance of 
Corporate  Governance has been recognized by the financial sector most recently.  Corporate 
Governance practices are also being looked at by rating agencies, and they have an impact on the 
cost of capital in the United States of America. 
Different Models of Corporate Governance around the World 
(1)   Anglo-American Model   
There are different models of corporate governance around the world.  These differ according to  
the variety of capitalism in which they are embedded.  The liberal model that is common in  
Anglo-American countries tends to give priority to the interests of shareholders.  The  
coordinated model that one finds in Continental Europe and Japan also recognizes the interest of  
workers, managers, suppliers, customers, and the community. 
Both models have distinct competitive advantages, but in different ways.  The liberal model of  
corporate governance encourages radical innovation and cost competition, whereas the  
coordinated model of corporate governance facilitates incremental innovation and quality  
competition.  
In the United States, a corporation is governed by a Board of Directors, which has the power to  
choose an executive officer, usually known as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO).  The CEO has  
broad power to manage the corporation on a daily basis, but needs to get board approval for  
certain major actions, such as hiring immediate subordinates, raising money, acquiring another  
company, major capital expansions, or other expensive projects.  Other duties of the board may  
include; policy setting, decision making, monitoring management performance and corporate  
control. 
The Board of Directors is nominally selected by and responsible to the shareholders, but the bye- 
law of many companies makes it difficult for all but the largest shareholders to have any  
influence over the makeup of the board; normally, individual shareholders are not offered a  
choice of nominees among which to choose, but are merely asked to rubberstamp the  
nominees of the sitting board.  Outrageous incentives have pervaded many corporate boards in  
the developed world, with board members beholden to the Chief Executive whose actions they  
are intended to oversee.  Frequently, members of the Board of Directors are CEOs of other  
corporations, which some see as a conflict of interest. 
(2) Non-Anglo-American Model 
In East Asian Countries, family-owned companies dominate.  A study by Claessens, Djankov  
 
and Lang (2000) investigated the top 15 families in East Asian countries and found that they  
 
dominated listed corporate assets.  In countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, the top 15  
 
families controlled over 50% of publicly owned corporations through a system of family cross- 
 
holdings, thus dominating the capital markets.  Family-owned companies also dominate the Latin  
 
model of corporate governance that is companies in Italy, France, Brazil, Mexico and other  
 
countries in South America. 
 
An Overview of Corporate Governance and Organizational Performance  
 
Opinions seem to be changing since many saw corporate governance as a further piece of  
 
bureaucracy to deal with, when the term came into widespread use early in the 1990s.  In June,  
 
2000, the management consultant McKinsey & Company published its investor survey opinion  
 
on Corporate Governance (CG).  In collaboration with the World Bank, McKinsey obtained  
 
responses from over 200 institutional investors who between them managed US $3.25 trillion.   
 
Over 80% of these said they would pay 18% more for the shares of a well governed UK  
 
Company than one with similar performance but poor governance practices.  These practices  
 
increased to 27% for shares in companies in Indonesia or Venezuela, countries which have  
 
generally poorer governance practices.  Further evidence of opinion was obtained by a survey  
 
conducted by KPMG in South Africa.  They surveyed Directors’ perceptions of corporate  
 
governance.  Directors from 146 of 510 listed companies surveyed responded, 83% believed that  
 
corporate governance was of utmost importance in contributing to an organization’s  
 
performance.   The KPMG survey suggests that, in South Africa at least, Directors see a strong  
 
link between good corporate governance and corporate performance.  Recent company failures  
 
have further highlighted the importance of good corporate governance. 
 
Until recently, Enron was the USA;s seventh largest company by stock market valuation, but in  
 
December, 2001, it filed for Bankruptcy.  Smarter investors are aware of some of the governance  
 
weaknesses in Enron in particular the incomprehensibility of its annual report, but they invested  
 
any way with other investors joining the bandwagon. 
 
Further Contributors to Corporate Governance Literature 
 
A couple of other professionals and authors have made significant contributions on the subject of  
 
corporate governance and its effect on the performance of financial institutions and banks in  
 
particular. 
       
These views are as follows: 
 
Corporate Governance is the set of mechanisms that translate signals from product and input  
 
markets into corporate behavior.  (Oman, 2003).  This definition focuses on two elements, one,  
 
the signals generated from outside the organization and control structures within the  
 
organization. 
 
Corporate Governance refers to the process and structures by which the business and the affairs  
 
of an institution are directed in order to improve long-term shareholding.  Corporate Governance  
 
is therefore  about building credibility, ensuring transparency and accountability as well as  
 
maintaining an effective channel of information disclosure that would foster good corporate  
 
performance (Unegbu, 2003) 
 
Corporate Governance refers to the concept concerned with the structures within which a  
 
corporate entity or enterprise receives its basic orientation and direction (Rwegasira, 2000) 
 
In his view, corporate governance should be viewed in terms of issues relating to shareholders’  
 
protection, management control and the popular principal-agent problems of economic theory. 
 
Lemo (2004) examines corporate governance involvement as a relationship between an  
 
institution’s board and management its shareholders and customers.  He said generally that the  
 
concept of corporate governance embraces such issues as: 
 
 Effectiveness and efficiency of operations 
 
 Reliability of financial reporting 
 
 Compliance with law and regulations 
 
 Safeguarding of assets 
 
 Executive remuneration 
 
Sullivan, (2000) believes that corporate governance is the heart of both a market economy and a  
 
democratic society.   
  
Corporate Governance in Nigerian Banks 
 
It is no news that most instances of financial distresses and corporate failures are attributable to  
 
poor corporate governance.  It is therefore pertinent for banks to observe a strong corporate  
 
governance ethics given their opaqueness and strategic importance to economic development. 
 
The collapse of many companies and in particular banks in Nigeria caused the lack of confidence  
 
which was perceived in financial reporting and in the ability of auditors to provide the assurances  
 
required by the users of financial statements.  The main difficulties were considered to be in the  
 
relationship between Auditors and Board s of Directors.  Specifically, the commercial pressures  
 
to be brought to bear on auditors by the board and the auditors often capitulated.   
 There was also the perceived problem of the ability of Boards of Directors to control their  
 
organizations.  These problems have been debated for a while, but recent company collapses,  
 
usually sudden and unexpected intensified the worries of regulatory bodies, the Central Bank of  
 
Nigeria (CBN) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
 
Several efforts have been made towards entrenching corporate governancve in our corporate  
 
structures especially the financial system of which banks are indispensable parts.  The Security  
 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) set up a 17  
 
member committee, inaugurated on 15th of June, 2000,headed by Atedo Peterside (OON).  The  
 
terms of reference of the committee were: 
 
 To examine practices in other jurisdictions with a view to the adoption of international  
 
practices in corporate governance in Nigeria. 
 
 To make recommendations on necessary changes to current practices. 
 
 To examine any other issues relating to corporate governance in Nigeria. 
 
 To identify weaknesses in the current corporate governance practices in Nigeria and  
 
fashion out necessary changes that will improve the practices. 
 
In the course of its work, the Committee found that “the system of corporate governance in  
 
Nigeria is still in its developmental stage”, noting that principles of corporate governance are not  
 
well appreciated in the country.  The Committee’s survey revealed that only 40% of the public  
 
quoted companies had codes of corporate governance.  It pointed out that those without codes  
 
were willing to embrace one, emphasizing the urgent need for the development of a code for  
 Nigeria.  The code addresses three broad areas of corporate governance:  The board of directors,  
 
the shareholders and the audit committee. 
 
The findings of the Peterside Atedo led committee is justified by the number of failed banks in  
 
Nigeria between 1993 and 2004.   
 
Corporate Governance in Nigerian Organizations    
Corporate Governance is of crucial importance in a developing country such as Nigeria. 
In recent memory in this country, the lack of good corporate governance led to economic 
 upheavals.  Let us use two examples to illustrate this point.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
 the country witnessed a near collapse of the financial sector through the phenomenon of failed 
 banks and other financial institutions.  In consequence, the failed banks (Recovery of Debt) and 
 Financial Malpractice in Banks Act was promulgated to facilitate the prosecution of those who 
 contributed to the failure of banks and to recover the debt owed to the failed banks.   
Secondly, the privatization and commercialization programme of the Nigerian Government was  
 a reactionto the failure of corporate governance in state-owned enterprises.  Data obtained from  
 government departments revealed that in 1998, Nigerian public enterprises enjoyed about N265 
 billion in transfers, subsidies and waivers, which could have been better invested in our 
 education, health and other social sectors.  There is virtually no public enterprise in Nigeria 
 today that functions well.  While they were created to alleviate the shortcomings of the private 
 sector and spearhead the development of Nigeria, many of them have stifled entrepreneurial 
development and fostered economic stagnation.  Public enterprises have served as forms of 
 patronage and the promotion of political objectives, and consequently suffer from operational 
 interference from civil servants and political appointees.  Our experience in the last four years 
 has shown many examples that clearly establish the poor levels of corporate governance in 
 public enterprises, including the banking industry (El-Rufai, 1998) 
 
2.2.1 The importance of Hard-Skills and Soft-Skills in Corporate Governance 
During the 3rd African Engineering Deans Council (AEDC) Summit held in July, 2017 at 
Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State, the summit noted that engineers use their knowledge and 
hard operational skills to create things.  However, the conference agreed that hard skills of 
engineers are not enough in corporate governance and productivity.  Soft skills are essential to 
complement productive capacity required for organizational success.  According to Obi (2017), 
soft skills would normally include; courtesy, ethical conduct, humane approach to colleagues, 
consideration for customers and other traits and qualities that make someone a good employee.   
Privatization and Commercialization programmes by the Federal Government  
Partly due to the ugly events in the financial sector and partly due to the poor performance of the 
 public enterprises, the Federal Government of Nigeria sought to divest its equity in some of 
 these enterprises through privatization and commercialization.  This is to enable some of these 
 enterprises to institute effective corporate governance and to operate profitably.   
Before privatization and commercialization, it was observed that some of the privately-owned 
Banks and other corporate organizations were also not doing better than state-owned enterprises 
 due to their poor  corporate governance practices.   
A few examples will suffice.  The first example is Savannah Bank.  The Central Bank of Nigeria 
 (CBN) withdrew the banking license of Savannah Bank on the 15th February, 2002 because of a 
 number of reasons.  In a press release dated 18th February, 2002, the CBN listed the reasons as 
  the ineffectiveness of the board as well as the ineptitude and instability of the management, the 
 false and unreliable returns to the regulatory authorities, the insolvent and deteriorating financial 
position of the bank, inability of the bank to respond to various regulatory initiatives, and the 
 urgent need to protect the interest of depositors and the banking system as a whole.  To cite  
example of a privately-owned company, Onwuka Interbiz was listed on the second-tier 
 securities market of the Nigerian Stock Exchange on the 9th September, 1991.  Six years later, it 
 was de-listed and folded up.  The third example of the failure of corporate governance in 
 privately-owned companies is the revocation of the banking license of Peak Merchant Bank by  
the Central Bank of Nigeria.  In a press release dated 28th February, 2003, the apex bank noted 
 that the bank had been licensed on 15th February, 1991 and that it was revoking its license 
 because of weak and incompetent management, insolvency, the over-bearing influence of the 
 Chairman who was also the majority shareholder of the bank, persistent liquidity problem, poor 
 asset quality, significant insider abuses, poor track record of profitability, lack of seriousness 
 over its business activities, inability and unwillingness of shareholders to recapitalize, reckless 
 granting of credits, complete absence of focus and lack of good corporate governance (Nigeria 
 Deposit Insurance Corporation Annual Report, 2005 on Corporate Governance and Firms’ 
 Performance). 
Indigenization Programme of the Federal Government 
The indigenization programme led to a diffusion of shareholding in Nigeria because of the 
 automatic divestment of foreign shareholding.  While the Nigerian shareholding was largely 
 fragmented, the foreign shareholding was intact such that they became the dominant partner in 
 many respects.  Thus, while in many instances Nigerians were the owners of the business, 
foreigners were in control especially with the weighted voting schemes whereby foreign shares 
 had more votes than Nigerian shares.  Even though the weighted voting share scheme is no 
 longer possible under the company and Allied Matters Act 1990 (as amended), and the 
 indigenization scheme has been abolished, the shareholding typology brought about by the 
 scheme is still in place and the fact remains that a large number of these firms still have 
 dominant foreign shareholders and a diffused Nigerian shareholding.  Again, if the listing 
 requirements of the Nigerian Stock Exchange is any yardstick to go by, the fact that public 
 companies on the First Tier Securities Market must have at least 300 members and those on the 
 Second Tier Securities Market must have 150 shareholders and that between the two markets 
 there are 197 companies listed on the exchange, it can be stated with some measure of 
 confidence that shareholding in Nigeria is largely diffused. 
Moreover, the process of privatization through public offers, which is largely through the 
 Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), has led to diffused shareholding especially as there are 
prohibitions against the acquisition of more than 0.1% of offered shares especially if the issue is 
 oversubscribed.  However, that is not the whole truth.  There are significant cases of majority 
 shareholding.  Most private companies largely born out of family and social ties have such 
 members as majority shareholders.  Again there seems to be a significant presence of Nigerian 
 and foreign institutional shareholders amongst companies listed on the NSE, making it logical to 
 argue that some of these companies have majority shareholding.  More recently, the process of 
 identification of core strategic investor in the privatization programme invariably leads to a 
 dominant shareholder because as the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) states, the process 
 enables the acquisition of 51% or more of the equity of the enterprises which will provide the 
 core investor with management control.  It is therefore in order to conclude that Nigeria is not 
characterized by one typology of companies.  This analysis is important because of the generally 
 accepted corporate governance responses to different typology of companies.  Consequently, 
 there is often the promotion of management’s interests to the detriment of investors leading to 
 the so called “Agency Costs” on investors.  On the other hand, a dominant shareholding is 
 potentially capable of leading to corporate abuse and minority oppression.  In view of the 
 importance attached the Federal Government of Nigeria, through her various agencies have 
 come up with various institutional arrangements to protect the investo4rs of their hard-earned 
 investment from unscrupulous management/directors of listed firms in Nigeria (Grosfeld, 2002).   
These institutional arrangements was provided in the Code of Corporate Governance for Best 
 Practices.  The Central Bank of Nigeria in its continuing efforts to enhance corporate 
 governance in the Nigerian Banking System has come up with the Corporate Governance Code 
 which is intended to promote international best practice in the corporate governance of Nigerian 
 banks.  The Code draws upon international best practice, in particular, the Organization of 
 Economic corporation and Development (OECD) principles of Corporate Governance and the 
 guidance issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (CBN, 2006).  The title of the  
   Publication was “Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations.”  However, it 
 is worthy to note that the interest in corporate governance is not limited to governmental or 
 banking institutions, some private forums and associations have also been established to 
 enhanced the adoption of the concept of corporate governance. 
Elements of Corporate Governance  
The major elements of corporate governance are good board practices, control environment, 
 transparent disclosure, well-defined shareholder rights and board commitment.  The four pillars 
 of corporate governance are: accountability, fairness, transparency and independence (Omeiza 
 Michael, 2009).  Weil et al. (2002) concluded that although, corporate governance can be 
 defined in a variety of ways, generally, it involves the mechanisms by which business enterprise 
 organized in a limited corporate form is directed and controlled.  It usually concerns mechanism 
by which corporate managers are held accountable for corporate conduct and performance 
. Following the leadership of Ricardo (2000) and as documented by Oyejide and Soyibo (2001), 
 we review the different provisions of legislation governing corporate governance in the Nigerian 
 banking industry from three perspectives: disclosure and transparency; minority and shareholder 
 right; and oversight management. An essential feature of a corporation is the separation of 
 ownership from management.  To this end, the shareholders delegate decision making rights to 
 managers to act on their behalf.  However, this separation of ownership from control implies a 
loss of effective control by shareholders over managerial decisions.  Thus, the primary objective 
 of corporate governance is to achieve an alignment of the managerial incentives with those of 
 stakeholders (Oyejide & Soyibo, 2001).  
  Popularity of Corporate Governance Issues  
Corporate governance issues have received wide attention of researchers for more than three 
 decades now.  The definition of the term goes along the line of who is defining the term.  For 
 instance, the way the investor will define the term may be different from the definition of a 
 manager in the firm.  Metrick and Ishii (2002), for example, defined corporate governance from 
 the perspective of the investor as both the promise to repay a fair return on capital invested and 
 the commitment to operate a firm efficiently with a given investment.  Now, this definition 
 clearly states the need to raise funds and give adequate return as the yardstick or guiding drive 
of the definition.  That is why Oman, (2003) argue that firm level governance may be 
 more important in developing markets with weaker institutions as it helps to distinguish among 
 firms.  According to Kaplan and Minton (1997), corporate governance is concerned with ways  
 of bringing the interests of investors and managers into line and ensuring that firms are run for  
 the benefit of investors.  
Corporate governance is concerned with the relationship between the internal governance 
mechanisms of corporations and society’s conception of the scope of corporate accountability 
(Deakin and Hughes, 1997).  Corporate governance as defined by Alexander and Matts, (2003) 
 refers to corporate decision making and control, particularly the structure of the board and its 
working procedures.  Robert (2004) sees the term as the arrangement between the managers of 
the firm and the owners of the firm, particularly, addressing the issue of how managers report the 
financial health of the firm to the owners.  Cadbury Committee (1992) defines corporate 
governance as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”.  Corporate 
governance has also been defined by Keasey, et al. (1997) to include the structures, processes, 
cultures and systems that engender the successful operation of organizations.  The definition 
could therefore be centered on how the organization relates with other stakeholders within an 
environment.  Therefore, corporate governance describes how companies ought to be run, 
directed and controlled (Cadbury Committee, 1992).  It is about supervising and holding those 
who direct and control the management responsible for errors and misdeeds. 
 
Determination of Good and Bad Corporate Governance  
The problems faced by researchers is not only on defining the term “Corporate Governance” but 
also what level of corporate governance leads to good or bad corporate governance.  This 
research work therefore identified factors that best define good corporate governance.  
Furthermore, the research study addresses the issue of firms’ performance which, over the years, 
has also received wide range of interpretations.  Some look at a firm’s performance to mean the 
development of share prices, while others have the view that a firm is performing when it has 
made a lot of profit or it has increased its present value. 
Corporate governance has been identified in previous studies Bhagat, 1999  and Abor, (2007) to 
influence the capital structure decisions of firm (especially large and listed firms).  The extant 
literature identified the main characteristics of corporate governance to include board size, board 
composition, CEO duality, tenure of the CEO and CEO compensation.  However, empirical 
results on the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure appear to be 
varied and inconclusive.  The board of directors is charged with the responsibility of managing 
the firm and its operation.  According to Robert (2004), there is a significant relationship 
between capital structure and board size.  Bhagat, (1999) found that firms with larger board 
membership have low leverage or debt ratio.  They assume that larger board size translates into 
strong pressure from the corporate board to make managers pursue lower leverage or debt ratio 
rather than have larger boards.      
Code of Corporate Governance Practices for Banks 
 
The code of corporate governance practices for banks post consideration released by the CBN on  
 
March 1, 2006 with an effective date of April 3, 2006 has six (6) areas of coverage as follows: 
 
(1) Equity Ownership 
 
The current practice of free, non-restrictive equity holding has led to serious abuses by  
 
individuals and their family members as well as governments in the managements of banks.    
 
However, to encourage a private sector-driven economy, holdings by individuals and corporate  
 
bodies in banks should be more than that of governments.  It is also recognized that individuals  
 
who form part of management of banks in which they also have equity ownership have a  
 
compelling business interest to run them well.  Such arrangements should be encouraged.   
 
Government direct and indirect equity holding in any bank shall be limited to 10% by the end of  
 
2007.  Equally, an equity holding of above 10% by any investor is subject to CBN”s prior  
 
approval. 
 
(2) Organizational Structure 
 
The responsibilities of the head of the Board, that is, the Chairman, should be clearly separated  
 
from that of the Head of Management (i.e. the MD/CEO), such that no one individual/related  
 
party has unfettered powers of decision-making by occupying the two positions at the same time.   
 
No one person should combine the post of Chairman/Chief Executive of any bank.  For the  
 
avoidance of doubt, also no executive Vice-Chairman is recognized in the structure.  No two  
 
members of the same extended family should occupy the position of Chairman and that of Chief  
 
Executive or Executive Director of a bank at the same time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 (3) Equality of Board Membership 
 
Institutions should be headed by an Executive Board composed of qualified individuals that are  
 
conversant with its oversight functions.  Existing CBN guidelines on appointment to the Board  
 
of financial institutions should continue to be observed.  Only people of proven integrity and  
 
who are knowledgeable in business and financial matters should be on the Board.  Regular  
 
training and education of Board members on issues pertaining to their oversight functions should  
 
be institutionalized and budgeted for annually by banks.  The Board should  have the latitude to  
 
hire independent consultants to advise it on certain issues and the cost borne by the banks. 
       
The number of non-Executive Directors should be more than that of Executive Directors subject  
 
to a maximum board size of (20) Directors.  At least two (2) non-executive board members  
 
should be independent directors (who do not represent any particular shareholder interest and  
 
hold no special business interest with the bank) appointed by the bank on merit. 
 
A committee of non-executive directors should determine the remuneration of executive  
 
directors.  There should be strict adherence to the existing code of conduct for bank directors,  
 
failing which the regulatory authorities would impose appropriate sanctions including removal of  
 
the erring Director from the Board.  Non-executive Directors’ remuneration should be limited to  
 
sitting allowances, directors’ fees and reimbursable travel and hotel expenses.  
 
In order to ensure both continuity and injection of fresh ideas, non-executive directors should not  
 
remain on the board of bank continuously for more than three terms or four years each, that is, 12  
 
years.  Banks should have clear succession plans for their top executives.  There should be, as a  
 minimum, the following Board Committees; Risk Management Committee, Audit Committee,  
 
and the Credit Committee.  The practice of the Board Chairman serving simultaneously as  
 
Chairman/member of any of the Board committee is against the concept of independent and  
 
sound corporate government practice, and should be discontinued forthwith. 
 
(4) Board Performance Appraisal 
 
While adherence to the corporate governance principles is recognized as necessary for successful  
 
performance of Boards, it is often not a sufficient condition.  Hence, the need for Board  
 
performance reviews or appraisal as a new concept to ensure successful or exceptional  
 
performance.  Each Board should identify and adopt, in the light of the company’s future  
 
strategy, its critical success factors or key strategic objectives. Board should determine the skills,  
 
knowledge and experience that members require to achieve those objectives.  A Board should  
 
work effectively as a team towards those strategic objectives.   
 
There should be annual Board and Directors review or appraisal covering all aspects of the  
 
Board’s structure and composition, responsibilities, processes and relationships, as well as  
 
individual member’s competencies and respective role in the Board’s performance.  The review  
 
should be carried out by an outside consultant.  The review report should be presented at the  
 
AGM and a copy sent to the CBN. 
 
(5)  Quality Management  
 
Appointment to top management positions should be based on merit rather than some other  
 
considerations.  Existing guidelines on appointments to op management of banks should  
 continue to be observed.  Track records of appointees should be an additional eligibility  
 
requirement.  Such records should cover both integrity (fit and proper persons as revealed by the  
 
CBN, ‘black book’, CRMs, etc.) and past performance in visible places of work.  
 
(6) Reporting Relationship  
 
Officers should be held accountable for the duties and responsibilities attached to their respective  
 
offices.  The structure of any bank should reflect clearly defined and acceptable lines of  
 
responsibility and hierarchy.  
 
The Role of Different Parties towards Good Corporate Governance   
   
(1) The Role of the Board of Directors 
 
The Board needs a range of skills and understanding to be able to deal with various business  
 
issues and have the ability to review and challenge management performance.  It needs to be of  
      
sufficient size and have an appropriate level of commitment to fulfill its responsibilities and  
 
duties.  There are issues about the appropriate mix of executive and non-executive directors.   
 
These issues have been handled to some extent by the CBN code of corporate governance. 
 
(2)  The Role of Shareholders 
 
Abel (2008) wrote that “the role of shareholders activism in the proper management of corporate  
 
entities has been properly established in the literature.  Suffice it to say that organizations with  
 
active shareholders are most likely to adopt good corporate governance principles and ultimately,  
 
would experience better performance and greater value creation.  This is the right way to go.  As  
 
owners of the companies, shareholders can express their dissatisfaction with the economic  
 decisions taken by Board members by exercising their right to vote them out at AGMs.  They can  
 
divest from the company, to drive home their dissatisfaction with severe implications for share  
 
prices and market capitalization.  
 
(3)   The Role of Audit Committee 
 
There are contributions that audit committee can make to the raising of the standards of  
 
corporate governance in Nigeria.  Section 359, sub-section 3 of the Companies and Allied  
 
Matters Act 1990, as amended to date, stipulates that every public company in Nigeria must have  
 
an audit committee to which the external auditors must report, in addition to reporting to the  
 
shareholders.  The functions of the audit committee are spelt out in section 359, sub-section 6 as  
 
follows: 
 
 Ascertain whether the accounting and reporting policies of the company are in  
 
accordance with legal requirements and agreed ethical practices. 
 
 Review the scope and planning of audit requirements.  
 
 Review the findings of management matters in conjunction with the external auditors and  
 
departmental responses thereon. 
 
 Keep under review the effectiveness of the company’s system of accounting and control. 
 
 Make recommendations to the Board with regard to the appointment, removal and  
 
remuneration of external auditors of the company. 
 
 Authorize the internal auditor to carry out investigations into any activity of the company  
 
which may be of interest or concern to the committee. 
Joseph (2008) noted “the future is bright in respect of the contributions that audit  
 
committees can make to the raising of the standards of corporate governance in Nigeria”. 
 
(4)  The Role of Regulators 
 
The role of regulators, that is CBC, SEC and CAC cannot be over-emphasized.  It is obvious that  
 
good corporate governance in the present banking milieu will be best guaranteed y external  
 
institutions having regulatory oversight over the banks.  Many countries have recognized that the  
 
abuse of corporate power cannot be adequately constrained by leaving it to the company’s  
 
members to ensure that the controllers behave and to take actions in the law court if they do not.  
 
The Nigerian SEC is vested with the power not only to regulate essentially through its  
 
registration requirements but also to discipline listed companies through its power of suspension  
 
and revocation of such registration.  The CAC is empowered to appoint investigators to  
 
investigate the affairs of a company if an application, supported by evidence showing good  
 
reasons, is made by members of a company holding not less than one-quarter of the shares.  
 
Furthermore, the CAC may appoint investigators to investigate the affairs of a company if a  
 
court by order declares that the affairs of the company ought to be so investigated on grounds,  
 
among others, that: 
 
 The company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly  
 
prejudiced to some part of its members. 
 
 Persons concerned with the company’s formation or the management of its affairs has  
 
been guilty of fraud, misfeasance or other misconducts towards the company.  
   
Based on the report of the investigators, the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) or the 
Attorney General of the Federation may institute civil or criminal proceedings as appropriate 
against any person or firm found liable. The CBN on its own has been duty vested with powers 
under Banks and Other Financial Institutions Degree (BOFID) 1991 to exercise total control and 
supervision of all banks and other financial institutions.  It was this power that the CBN invoked 
in the year 2009 when a special examination was carried out on all the 24 banks leading to the 
eventual dismissal of the MDs/CEOs of 8 banks. 
However, the regulators have not been up and doing as attested to by the exposure of the eight  
 
(8) banks to absolute risks.  Indeed, the CBN Governor, Mallam Sanusi Lamido, in an interview  
 
with Sunday Punch Newspaper on August 16, 2009 titled: “There is clearly a failure of  
 
regulation – Sanusi” stated that “I think the Central Bank and other regulators failed in focusing  
 
their attention on that and I have made that point very clear”. Indeed, the regulators ought to be  
 
up and doing in the discharge of their duties of regulation. 
 
Problems and Weaknesses in Corporate Governance of Banks in Nigeria 
 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), identified some problems and weaknesses in corporate  
 
governance of banks in Nigeria.  These problems are: 
 
 Disagreement between Board and Management giving rise to Board squabbles. 
 
 Ineffective Board oversight functions 
 
 Fraudulent and self-serving practices among members of the Board, Management and  
 
Staff. 
  
 Overbearing influence of the Chairman or MD/CEO especially in family-controlled  
 
banks 
 
 Weak internal control 
 
 Ignorance of non-compliance with rules, laws and regulations guiding banking business 
 
 Non-compliance with laid down internal controls and operational procedures 
 
 Passive shareholders 
 
 Poor risk management practices resulting in large quantum of non-performing credits  
 
including insider-related credits 
 
 Abuses in lending, including lending in excess of single obligor limit. 
 
 Sig-tight Directors even where such directors fail to make meaningful contributions to the  
growth and development of the bank. 
 
 Succumbing to pressure from other stakeholders; example shareholders appetite for high  
 
dividend and depositors quest for high interest on deposits. 
 
 Technical incompetence, poor leadership and administrative abilities. 
 
 Inability to plan and respond to changing business circumstances. 
 
 Ineffective management information system. 
 
Challenges of Corporate Governance in Nigerian Banks  
 
Wilson (2006) opines that in the context of Nigeria, it is difficult to overlook the circumstances  
 
under which the twenty five (25) banks emerged at the close of the consolidation exercise.   
 
The fact that a good measure of mergers consummated was forced and the time available limited  
 
posed great challenge to the banks.  The CBN acknowledged those challenges of Corporate  
 
Governance for Banks and these are: 
 Technical Incompetence of Board and Management 
 
In view of the greatly enhanced resources of the consolidated entities, Board members may lack  
 
the requisite skills and competencies to effectively redefine, re-strategize, restructure, expand  
 
and or refocus the enlarged entities in the area of change of corporate entities, new business  
 
acquisitions, branch consolidations, expansion and product development. 
 
Relationship among Directors  
 
Boardroom squabbles could be an issue due to different business cultures and high ownership  
 
concentration especially in banks that were formerly family “one-man” entities.  The dominance  
 
of a “key man” could emerge with the attendant problems. 
 
Relationship Between management and Staff 
 
Squabbles arising from knowledge gaps, harmonization of roles and salary structure could also  
 
manifest among staff and management of consolidating banks with the potential to create  
 
unhealthy competition and a counter-productive working environment. 
        
Increased Levels of Risks 
 
Currently, very few banks have a robust risk management system in place.  With huge amount of  
 
funds that will be available to them and the significantly increased legal lending limits, banks  
 
will be financing more long-term mega projects in the real sector of the economy as opposed to  
       
the existing working capital or trade financing.  Given the expected significant increase in the  
 
level of operations, the banks will be facing various kinds of risks which, if not well managed,  
 
will result in significant losses.  The management of risks in a transparent and ethical way will  
 thus present some issues bordering on corporate governance.  
 
Ineffective Integration of Entities 
 
Banks that would have completed the process of merging might continue to operaste  
 
independently rather than as a single entity. 
 
Inadequate Management Capacity 
 
Directors and Managers are now running a much larger organization and controlling a  
 
significantly higher level of resources.  Adequate management capacity is needed to efficiently  
 
and profitably run a large organization. 
 
 Resurgence of High Level Malpractices 
 
To boost the income as a result of intense competition and lack of enough viable projects,  
 
malpractices may resurface post consolidation.   Such sharp practices could include round- 
 
tripping of FOREX, sharp price manipulation, excess customer charges, falsification of records,  
 
creative accounting and adoption of unethical methods to poach customers.  
     
Insider-Related Lending 
 
If consolidation should fail to achieve transparency through diversification in bank ownership,  
 
the pervasive influence of family and related party affiliations may continue, resulting in huge  
 
levels of insider-abuses and connected lending. 
 
Rendition of False Reports 
 
Similarly, rendition of false returns to the regulatory authorities and concealment of information  
 
from examiners to prevent timely detection of unhealthy situations in the banks may continue as  
 a result of lack of transparency and pressure to boost income. 
 
Continued Concealment 
 
Continued concealment of material issues discovered by banks during their pre-merger due to  
 
diligence will also compromise good corporate governance. 
 
Ineffective Board/Statutory Audit Committee 
 
The Audit Committee compromise both directors and shareholders who are not board of  
 
directors may be composed of people who are not knowledgeable in accounting and financial  
 
matters thus rendering committee less effective.    
 
Inadequate Operational and Financial Controls 
 
There might be absence of such controls to cater for the increased size and complexity of  
 
operations. 
 
Absence of a Robust Risk Management System 
 
The huge amount of funds that will be available to banks post consolidation would significantly  
 
increase their legal lending limits and make them engage in financing long-term mega projects.   
 
The management of the attendant risks in a transparent and ethical manger would require, as part  
 
of sound practices, the institutionalization of a robust risk management system. 
 
Transparency and Adequate Disclosure of Information 
 
These are key attributes of good corporate governance which the merged banks must cultivate  
 
with new zeal in order to provide shareholders with the necessary information to judge whether  
 
their interests are being taken care of.  Currently, there are many deficiencies in the information  
 disclosure particularly in the area of risk management strategies, risk concentration, performance  
 
measures and so on. 
 
Failed Banks in Nigerian over the past two decades  
Several Nigerian Banks between 1993 and 2006 collapsed and went into liquidation as a result of  
blatant financial malpractices and poor corporate governance.  The Sunday Tribune of Sunday  
23rd November, 2003 captured the liquidated banks as listed below: 
(1)   Abacus Merchant Bank Limited  - January 16, 1998 
(2)   ABC Merchant Bank Limited  - January 16, 1998 
(3)   Allied Bank of Nigeria Plc.   - January 16, 1998 
(4)   Alpha Bank of Nigeria Limited  - September 8, 1994 
(5)   Amicable Bank of Nigeria   - January 16, 1998 
(6)    Century Merchant Bank Limited  - January 16, 1998 
(7)   Commerce Bank Limited   - January 16, 1998 
(8)   Commercial Trust Bank Limited  - January 16, 1998 
(9)   Continental Trust Bank Limited  - January 16, 1998 
(10) Cooperative and Commerce Bank Limited - January 16, 1998 
(11) Credit Bank Nigeria Limited   - January 16, 1998 
(12) Crown Merchant Bank Limited  - January 16, 1998 
(13) Financial Merchant Bank Limited  - January 21, 1998 
(14) Great Merchant Bank Limited  - January 16, 1998 
(15) Group Merchant Bank Plc.   - January 16, 1998 
(16) Highland Bank of Nigeria Plc.  - January 16, 1998 
(17) ICON Limited (Merchant Bankers)  - January 16, 1998 
(18) Ivory Merchant Bank Limited  - December 22, 2000 
(19) Capital Merchant Bank Limited  - January 21, 2004 
(20) Lobi Bank Nigeria Limited   - January 16, 1998 
(21) Mercantile Bank of Nigeria Plc.  - June 16, 1998 
(22) Merchant Bank of Africa Limited  - January 16, 1998 
(23) Nigerian Merchant Bank Limited  - January 16, 1998 
(24) North-South Bank Nigeria Plc.  - January 16, 1998 
(25)  Pan Africa Bank Limited   - January 16, 1998 
(26) Pinnacle Commercial Bank Plc.  - January 16, 1998 
(27) Premier Commercial Bank Plc.  - December 22, 2000 
(28) Prime Merchant Bank Limited  - January 16, 1998 
(29) Progress Bank of Nigeria Limited  - January 16, 1998 
(30) Republic Bank Limited   - June 25, 1995 
(31) Royal Merchant Bank Limited  - January 16, 1998 
(32) United Commercial Bank Limited  - September 8, 1998 
(33) Victory Merchant Bank Limited  - January 16, 1998 
(34) Rims Merchant Bank Limited  - December 22, 2000 
(35) Savannah Bank of Nigeria Plc.  - February 15, 2002 
(36) Hallmark Bank of Nigeria   - January 16, 2006 
(37) Gulf Bank Plc.    - January 16, 2006 
(38) Lead Bank Plc.    - January 16, 2006 
(39) Liberty Bank Plc.    - January 16, 2006 
(40) Metropolitan Bank Limited   - January 16, 2006 
(41) Peak Merchant Bank Plc.   - February 28, 2003 
(42) Societe Generale Bank Limited  - January 16, 2006 
(43) Triumph Bank Limited   - January 16, 2006   
 
CONCLUSION 
Consequent upon the recapitalization and consolidation of the financial system in Nigeria by the  
Federal Government through the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), many banks got into mergers  
and acquisitions as a means of survival.  This ultimately led to the reduction in the number of  
banks from about 89 to 25.  Mergers and acquisitions did not solve the problem entirely since  
many of the banks still find themselves in serious problem resulting from poor corporate  
governance.        
Other problems of the financial sector are traceable to the global financial crisis which began in  
the United States and United Kingdom with the global credit market grinding to a halt in 2008.        
The global stock market fell and many large financial institutions collapsed.  Governments of the  
industrial world all came up with different rescue packages to bail out the ailing financial  
system. The episode was also partly attributable to poor corporate governance and unethical  
practices in the banking sector.   
The Nigerian government was forced to put in place stringent financial policies through the  
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in an effort to restore sanity and confidence in the financial  
sector.  Part of the effort was to enforce strict corporate governance and discipline.  Naturally,  
prudent management, strict corporate governance and ethical culture were seen as essential for  
the rescue of the financial sector.  Policies were made to ensure that individuals appointed to the  
helm of affairs in the banks are professionals of proven ability to manage financial outfit. 
The emphasis on corporate governance today came as a result of the realization that corporate  
governance holds the key to the success and survival of a bank.  Governments in both the  
developed and developing nations know that growth and success of commerce and industry  
depend on the effective financial intermediation role played by the banking sector. 
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